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errors. 1 Introduction
In the absence of risk, a consumption tax is equivalent to a labor tax (see,
e.g., SalaniØ, 2003). When however we assume a stochastic context, this
equivalence result may fail to hold, unless ad hoc conditions are met.
As shown by Ashan (1989, 1990), equivalence holds under uncertainty
only if the wage tax is modi￿ed to account for excess returns, i.e., capital
gains/losses net of the risk-free rate of return. Applying a risk-free discount
rate, he shows indeed that the present value of revenues raised by this modi-
￿ed wage tax (hereafter MWT) is the same as under consumption-based tax-
ation. Zodrow (1995) criticizes Ashan￿ s use of the risk-free rate, by arguing
that the government cannot absorb risk costlessy. This implies that the rel-
evant discount rate must incorporate a risk premium. Zodrow (1995) proves
that, if the government￿ s discount rate is equal to the private expected return
to saving, a consumption tax is equivalent to a standard labor tax (rather
than to a MWT). In a more recent article, Ashan and Tsigaris (1998) have
responded to Zodrow￿ s (1995) critique by applying a certainty-equivalent ap-
proach. They show that if individuals hold e¢ cient portfolios, the relevant
discount rate is endogenously determined and, if applied by the government,
ensures the equivalence between a consumption tax and a MWT.
1It is worth noting that all these articles are based on the calculation of
the present value of future tax revenue.1 Therefore they share the use of an
ex-ante approach. However the existence of an ex-ante equivalence does not
necessarily imply that such taxes are equivalent from an ex-post perspec-
tive. To tackle the ex-post equivalence issue, Kaplow (1994) proposes a new
approach, that lets the government invest in risky assets and thus manage
resources actively.2 Using a two-period model, he shows that equivalence
holds on both an ex-ante and ex-post basis, provided that the government
can manage its portfolio with no limits (i.e., it can take in￿nite short or
long positions). Kaplow￿ s (1994) ￿ndings are based on some restrictive as-
sumptions. Indeed, he assumes that all the resources are invested at time
1 and consumed at time 2. Similarly, the government is assumed not to
spend at time 1: all the resources raised are indeed spend at time 2. Given
these limitations, Kaplow (1994) cannot deal with the fact that consump-
tion taxes postpone tax payments relative to labor taxes. As pointed out by
Summers (1981), indeed, under these two alternative systems, tax revenues
1For a detailed review of the relevant literature on taxation and risk taking see Schindler
(2008).
2A similar reasoning is used by Fahri (2007). He shows indeed that capital owner-
ship provides the government with a powerful hedging instrument. In such a context, the
government can perfectly approximate the complete markets allocation by taking an in￿-
nitely long or short position in capital. However, even with smaller positions, a substantial
welfare improvement can be achieved
2may di⁄er time by time, and therefore, the equivalence may fail to hold in
an intertemporal context.
In this article we aim to generalize Kaplow￿ s (1994) model by letting
the individuals consume also at time 1, and the government to spend in
each period. We will then show that if the government can manage risky
resources, labor and consumption taxes are equivalent in each period, and
therefore, the stricter de￿nition of time-by-time equivalence is achieved.
The structure of the article is as follows. Section 2 presents the model
and proves our equivalence result. Section 3 summarizes our ￿nding and
discusses possible extensions of the model.
2 The model
Let us assume a representative individual who lives for two periods, and
maximizes an expected utility function u(ct), that is strictly concave in ct,
i.e., consumption at time t = 1;2.3 By assumption, there are two assets: a
risk-free asset with a certain return r, and a risky asset with an stochastic
return equal to x. At time 1, the individual earns a wage income equal to y.4
3See, e.g., Sandmo (1985).
4Since income y is earned only at time 1, we can think of a representative individual
who works only when he is young and consumes in both periods. However, the quality of
3The sequence of the model is as follows.
At the beginning of time 1 the government chooses the tax rate and the
level of government spending. Then, the individual decides how much to
consume at time 1 and how much to invest in the risky and risk-free asset.
Given the consumer￿ s choice, the government raises revenues and ￿nances
public spending at time 1. Moreover, since the government can undertake
an active portfolio strategy, it can invest its surplus in both the risky and
risk-free assets.5
At time 2, the government earns the returns of its investment and, under
consumption taxation, also raises revenues. All these resources are aimed at
￿nancing public spending at time 2.
Given these assumptions we want to ￿nd under what conditions:
1. consumers make the same decisions;
2. government spending in each period is the same under both regimes in
each period.
If both conditions are met we can therefore say that these taxes are equiv-
alent. Denoting ￿w and ￿c as the wage and consumption tax rate, respec-
results would not change if we assumed that the individual also works when he is old.
5If public spending is higher than tax revenue at time 1, the government can issue a
bond, that will be repaid at time 2.
4tively, s as saving at time 1, and a as the portion of resources invested in the
risky asset, we can write the consumer￿ s budget constraints at time 1 and 2,
respectively:
(1 ￿ ￿w)y = (1 + ￿c)c1 + s (1)
(1 + ￿c)c2 = [1 + r + a(x ￿ r)]s: (2)
It is worth noting that (1) and (2) are the consumer￿ s budget constraints in
a general setting (i.e., with ￿w > 0 and ￿c > 0). In what follows however,
we will focus on two alternative regimes: a pure labor-tax system, with
￿w > ￿c = 0; and a pure consumption-based one, i.e., with ￿c > ￿w = 0.
Contrary to labor taxation, that ensures revenue raising only at time 1,
consumption taxation is levied in both periods.
Assuming for simplicity that a representative individual￿ s utility function
is additively separable,6 and de￿ning ￿ as the relevant discount factor, his/her
problem will be:
V (c1;c2;a) = maxc1;c2;a E [u(c1) + ￿u(c2)];
s:t: (1) and (2).
(3)
6Notice that the quality of results would not change if, following Zodrow (1995), we
assumed that the utility function is not additively separable.
5Before solving (3) we can rewrite it as follows. Let us solve (1) for s and
substitute the result into (2) so as to obtain:
(1 + ￿c)c2 = [1 + r + a(x ￿ r)]s
= [1 + r + a(x ￿ r)][(1 ￿ ￿w)y ￿ (1 + ￿c)c1];
which gives:







Let us next substitute (4) into (3), so as to rewrite a consumer￿ s problem as
follows:
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As shown in (6), neither regime has a direct impact on consumption. On
the other hand, Eq. (7) shows that the impact of these tax regimes on asset
allocation is the same only if tax rates are such that the equality (1 ￿ ￿w) =
1
1+￿c (or equivalently, ￿w = ￿c
1+￿c) holds.
Let us next analyze the government￿ s policy, that consists of both tax rate
setting and portfolio decisions. Given (6) and (7), we will calculate under
what conditions, the government can make consumption and labor taxation
equivalent.
Labor income tax Let us denote gt as public spending at time t = 1;2.
Under labor taxation, the government￿ s public budget constraint at time 1
is:







w are the amount of resources invested in the safe (s) and
risky (r) activity.8 Solving (8) for ￿s
w gives ￿s
w = ￿wy ￿ g1 ￿ ￿r
w: At time 2,
8Notice that ￿s
w and ￿r
w can be either positive or negative, because we have assumed
that the government can take both long or short positions. If for instance, g1 is larger
7government spending will be equal to the amount of resources earned by the
government. Therefore the budget constraint will be:
g2 = (1 + r)￿
s
w + (1 + x)￿
r
w (9)
= (1 + r)(￿wy ￿ g1) + ￿
r
w (x ￿ r):
Consumption tax Under a consumption tax, the amount of resources
collected at time 1 is equal to ￿cc1:Given g1, the public budget constraint is
equal to:







c are the amount of resources invested in the safe (s) and
risky (r) asset.9 Solving (10) for ￿s
c gives ￿s
c = ￿cc1 ￿ g1 ￿ ￿r
c. Therefore,
public spending at time 2 will be equal to:
g2 = (1 + r)￿
s
c + (1 + x)￿
r
c + ￿cc2; (11)
Substituting (4) into (11) we therefore obtain:
than the amount of resources collected at time 1, the government can ￿nance its de￿cit
by issuing a risk-free bond. Resources raised by means of the debt issue can used to buy
the risky asset too.
9Notice that ￿s
c and ￿r
c can be both positive and negative. Their sign depends on the
governemnt￿ s portfolio strategy.
8g2 = (1 + r)￿
s
c + (1 + x)￿
r
c + ￿cc2 (12)

















Let us next compare (9) with (12). We can show that, given g1 and con-
dition ￿w = ￿c
1+￿c, both regimes can ￿nance the same amount public spending












Condition (13) states that, given a, y, and c1 (that are known to the govern-
ment), the government can adjust the amount of resources invested in the
risky asset so as to ensure the same value of public spending in both regimes.
Since g1 is the same and condition ￿w = ￿c
1+￿c holds, if condition (13) is met,
equivalence holds.
It is worth noting that the di⁄erential (￿r
w ￿ ￿r
c) is equal to the product
between ￿c and the amount of resources invested in risky assets under con-
sumption taxation. Since the RHS of (13) is positive, the amount of resources
invested in risky assets is larger under a labor tax than under a consumption
tax. The intuition behind this result is as follows: under a consumption tax
9the amount collected at time 2 is stochastic. Therefore, consumption taxa-
tion has two sources of risk: that related to tax revenue collection and that
due to investment in the risky asset. On the other hand, labor taxation is
subject only to the latter source of risk. This means that in order for equiv-
alence to hold, the amount of resources invested in the risky asset under a
consumption tax must be less than that invested under a labor tax. If the
di⁄erence (￿r
w ￿ ￿r
c) is such that equality (13) holds, then the two sources
of risk under consumption taxation entail the same riskiness as under labor
taxation.
3 Concluding remarks
In this article we have shown that labor and consumption taxes are equivalent
in each period. This result is guaranteed by the fact that the government
has two objectives (i.e., g1 and g2) and two policy tools, i.e., tax rates and
the portfolio management strategy.
It is worth noting that equivalence result has not been achieved by as-
suming the existence of complete markets. Rather, it can be obtained if the
government can buy and sell, with no speci￿c limitation, the same assets
10managed by private investors.10
The equivalence conditions obtained in this article can be studied in a
more general setting, where, for instance, there are more than two periods,
and, like Summers (1981), overlapping generations exist. We leave these
extensions to future research.
10I wish to thank Enrico Minelli for this comment.
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